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Commentary and Reply

On “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’ ”
Miguel Peco

This commentary responds to Andrew Monaghan’s article: “The ‘War’ in Russia’s
‘Hybrid Warfare’ ” published in the Winter 2015–16 issue of Parameters (vol. 45,
no. 4).

A

ndrew Monaghan suggests “the war in Ukraine has refocused
Western attention on Russia and its ability to project power,
particularly in terms of ‘hybrid warfare’ ” (65). Using the label
“hybrid” in fact could result in overlooking the evolution of Russian
military thinking, which contemplates “the increasingly prominent role
of conventional force, including the use of high intensity firepower,
in Russian warfighting capabilities” (65). As a consequence, the author
warns that “NATO as a whole, and even the US itself cannot rely on the
automatic assumption that it would win a conventional war” and suggests
recalibrating away “from Hybrid warfare to mobilization” (74, 65). State
mobilization, or mobilizatsiya, is a concept included in the military doctrine
of the Russian Federation (2014) referring to measures for activating
resources and capabilities in order to achieve political aims. According
to Monaghan, mobilization provides a “more flexible understanding of
how the Russian leadership might view how that war might be fought
and won.”
Monaghan’s analysis on the implications of the hybrid warfare
phenomenon is insightful, and the proposal about the need to refocus
on the reality behind that label is consistent and pertinent. The concern
the author highlights the most—how to deal with a supposed Russian
conventional military superiority “in a specific place and at certain
time”—however, is arguably not the highest priority, or at least not the first
one that NATO may have. At the political level, NATO’s main concern
is a potential blockade of its reaction mechanisms, which are constrained
by the threshold set in Article 5, as well as an eventual lack of consensus
among member states. At the military level, nuclear capabilities are more
worrisome than conventional ones, especially when their potential use
is contemplated under the concept of de-escalation as an extension of
conventional war. For these reasons, I would suggest that, instead of
state mobilization, a better framework for analyzing the implications of
a potential conflict between the Russian Federation and NATO is what
has been labeled “strategic deterrence” (strategicheskoe sderzhivanie).
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M

iguel Peco argues that instead of “strategic mobilization,” a
better framework for analyzing the implications of a conflict
between NATO and Russia is “strategic deterrence,” which
he terms strategicheskoe sderzhivanie. This, he offers, is because a supposed
Russian conventional military superiority is not NATO’s highest priority,
which at the political level is a potential blocking of its decision-making
and reaction mechanism, and because Russian nuclear capabilities are
more worrisome than conventional ones.
These are important points. As I note in my article, understanding
Russian capabilities is not only about Russian conventional capability:
Moscow has both prioritized the maintenance, modernization, and
even enlargement of its nuclear triad, and also rehearsed how this
might be used. Indeed, one of the main points of the article was to
draw the emphasis away from understanding Russia through the prism
of “measures short of war” and to highlight that by 2015 Russia had
been preparing its armed forces for a regional confrontation with
possible escalation into using nuclear weapons for at least four years; in
other words, big warfighting operations with big formations. Nuclear
capabilities are sewn into Moscow’s defense and security thinking and
posture, and it would be a mistake to see Russia’s conventional and
nuclear capabilities as somehow separate.
Peco’s point about deterrence raises two further questions. First,
while deterrence has become a central feature of the debate about the
Euro-Atlantic community’s relations with Russia, many policymakers
and analysts alike have argued deterrence theory and practice has
been largely forgotten by the Western policy community in the postCold War era and are having to be relearned. Moreover, strategicheskoe
sderzhivanie is too limited a framework for analyzing the implications
of potential conflict with Russia: it is just one pillar of strategic
deterrence—deterrence by denial. To this should be added deterrence
by punishment—in Russian, ustrasheniye.
And these are the reasons state mobilization is the main framework
for thinking about Russia today and for the foreseeable future.
Deterrence is primarily about the adversary, about understanding what
and how that adversary thinks and operates, why the adversary acts as it
does, and what will deter it from acting. Without such an understanding,
deterrence cannot work—indeed, without understanding the differences
between sderzhivanie and ustrasheniye, the wrong signals may be sent, and
signals from Moscow incorrectly understood, if received at all. State
mobilization is a concept that illuminates Russian activities across the
whole state, including the essential elements of how Moscow conceives
warfighting at the strategic level. It is the foundation, therefore, for much
Russian activity, incorporating readiness and state resilience, as well as
escalation and Russia’s own efforts to establish deterrence.

